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PRIVATIZATION IN POLAND

Abstract
It is hoped privatization in Poland will play a sig~ificant role in building democratic

political and social order by restoring economic interests as motivating factors for joint activity.
It is assumed that positive effects can be achieved in the short and midterm, accelerating changes

in popular attitudes toward more· liberal and market type solutions.

However, significant

changes in the largest companies of the state-owned sector are not likely to be accomplished
soon; thereby creating a barrier to rapid improvement in the system's efficiency and causing
increased conflict and social unrest. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the thesis of this paper
is that Poland has potentially the best chance among the post-Communist countries of East
Cen~al Europe to reach two goals simultaneously, i.e. to build both democracy and an efficient
market economy within one generation.

I
The so-callecLreal socialist system was completely unprecedented and displayed its
own identity and internal consistency~ · It was built upon the foundation of .state ownership., .
Within model analysis 1At can be argued that the central plan, ·the whole command ~onomy,
the·specific multi~l~vel structure of organization, its non-Weberian type of ht1reaucracy, the
single-party system and. the party· ieader's position within that system were the logical ·.
consequences of the- elimination of private ownership.
· ' . The act of nationalization depriving· private owners of.their property put all citizens.
into the same legal position--that of state· employees. · By• the same token, the organfaers of
production.and e~change were eliminated·. •The profit motive as the stimulus for economic
activity· and the basis for economic decision-making disappeared. The market lost its real i. ·basis,

i.e.· agents and' their interests were gone.
Thus the .central plan had to substitute for market agents in th~ir role •Of

decision-makers: .A multi-level -bureaucratic structure of organization had to be created in
order· to make possible transmission of detailed decisions· concerning all dimensions of
economic life to the units .at the bottom of this hierarchical pyramid. These units-were not
enterprises in the market sense. They were organizations directed from above, createq for
organizational· purposes, dependent upon and controlled by the upper bureaucratic levels.
This seems 'logical until we ask one· fundamental question: who is responsible for the
allocation .of decisio~s if the market is eliminated'?· The central planner must have. criteria
•

I

upon which to elaborate the plan. There were many theoretical approaches addressing .:this
problem. But this basic issue. was unsolvable ·even in -theory. Simply, no substitute for the
·. market as a mechanism ·to formulate society's preferences could, be found.

Political criteria

2

and the images of political leaders as to what that was best for the system, for the country
and {or themselves became the only practical solution. This very solution was at the heart
of the system; the real reason for the creation of the system itself. The logic of the system's
creators was the opposite of those who tried to understand it later. The group who turned
over power, and the logic of t~e system itself, combined to put basic allocative decisions into
the hands of one party's political leaders.· The single party political system in the Soviet
Union itself was the subsequent outcome of the elimination of pi;ivate ownership. There was
the room for only one large employee's.party, which was ideologically the party of workers
in large companies. Realistically, this was the party of bureaucrats and of those who wanted
to participate in power at different levels and/or have·access to special privileges and rewards
used by the leadership to keep them in .line. ·
The goals of those who created this party and later the needs of what they brought to
life, pushed the whole construction in the direction of a centralized, monopoly. The reason
Was simple. Rationalization of control appeared to be the only possible substitute "for
economic rationality and past- forms of social and political life as the·operational principle for
economic activity and management-mechanisms of personnel selection included. The latter
/

stemmed from the fact that in the system where the state is the only productive force,economic interests are eliminated as the basis for group identification. The resulting
atomized society is in some sense, "pure stock" in the disposition of power and a hegemonic
party apparatus is substituted for important social forces in their role of articulators of
)

demands and organizers of social and political life.

II
However; real. life is always more complicated and far richer than any model, so .the.
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countries of Central and Ea.stem Europe displayed no uniformity. Each developed. a different
variation on the mode~. From the_ very beginning, Pol~d had the most significant trouble ·
accepting the system. The Poles were especially· reluctant to adjust, .even though the state in·
Poland displaced the.relatively low degree of private ownership .. After the six years ·of
'

German occupation. with six million people killed, -changes in state borders, forced and
voluntary migration of millions, imprisonmen( of thousands -"as enemies of the socialist
revolution~• and. about .a million former army people abroad-"".a relatively ·small _number, of
direct owners existed.at that time. Some 24--million Poles survived the war·iff Poland, but
many of those who owried private property had fled· or dfod.
_By any measure of constrqction of socialism in the countries under consideration,
Poland was the most backward in,this respect in the Soviet camp. Polish agriculture was
not collectivized. Although small as far,as its share-in GNP-was.concerned, there was· a ·
relatively large number of private producer and private owners in the service sector~
Notwithstanding pressure in supp~rt of secular ~uthority, the influence of ·the church
remained strong, and there had been traditional tolerance ;toward relative pluralism in arts
and humanities. Polish political.culture stressed individual above-collective.:activity, not to
speak of the historic antagonism created by Tsarist-Russia's participation in the partition of
Poland and subsequent political repression. Nor did the stationing of Red Army -troops "in
Poland increase ·the popularity of the postwar system in which the Soviet Union was held up
,

-

-

.

-

-

as the matchless standard by. which to measure progress on th~ road to socialism.
- The experience· of Poland, where the· formal. remnants of private ownership existed
throughout. the entire consolida,tion period, confirm the thesis as to tlie importance of the- -predominant type of ownership rights as the basis for the way in which the economic, ·social

4

and political life of the population is organized. The state was the main owner, organizer,,
producer, investor and distributor, so the state (which in practice meant the party) organized,
managed, and controlled the whole structure in aninstrumental political way. Party bosses
dictated the acceptable scope and the rules of the game for the private margin. Discipline,
administrative coercion, in some instances, and repression--even moving toward terror, were
. the glue that gave the system the illusion of effectiveness: -It should be emphasized that
effectiveness itself was defined, measured and evaluated according to political criteria.
The remnants of formally private ownership2 in Poland was reflected in a tokenly
three-party system, coalition government and pluralistic representation in parliament.··
However, in truth, the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP), the party of the main owner,
totally controlled its "allies"--the· selection of their leaders, the resolutions of their
committees and assemblies and the articulation of their goals.
From an analysis of Polish experience it can be seen, that for the socialist system to
be in its own sense effective, there was no. need to have many millions of members in the
ruling party. Rather it was_ essential· to eliminate private ownership completely, to control
the institutions organized in such a way as to blur the division of power and responsibility for
decisions taken and to transform the political, social and economic role of law into an
dependent· instrument of ruling party politics. -

III
There have been a variety of different scenarios of development and reform in Poland
and in other Central European countries elaborated by political scientists in Western Europe,
the USA and Poland. Generally, it was thought that the economy would be the easiest to
change. In the 1960s and.70s this hypothesis was based on the widely held conviction that
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the economic changes were to some extent "technicalll problems, susceptible to 'technical'
solutions. More market meant more independence for firms, less detailed planning, stimulus .
for increased production; more rational jri.vestment decisions arid policy in face of the· . '
competition generated by the foreign trade;· The presence of private· farming· in· Poland as an
additional. factor usually completed the list of typical arguments supporting the conclusion. .
The general view in those days was ·that such changes would rationalize· the economic ·
system. and would be followed by changes in social relations;, thereby leading.to- more
significant social/political changes. The· least hope -~as for changes in the political sphere..
There was consensus of Western and Polish academic opinion thatthe·Soviet Union would.
not allqw sjgnificant changes in political dimensions in the European satellite/client ·countries.
As many times :before~ reality ·has niocked at.the-analysts. Politicatchanges have ·
proved to be historically the quickest and relatively easiest. Fundamental change in-the ·
economic-system is much harder than was thought, ;but what seems to be the hardest task of·
all is the process of:overcoming legacies of the socialist system in the popular.··
consciousness--and thus the behavior--of the average citizen: 3
.

.

·Polish professionals in different-fields have workf:<1 especially hard, _to understand-the
logic of the system, to answer why attempts to· reform it failed,
-- prescription for a healthy economy. By the second

and to articulate their

part of the 1980s, the •diagnosis based on ;

consensus among the majority of professionals, new elites and party: reformers was that to
get significant improverent in the economy, the political system itself must be·chariged. It
was on this basis that. the elites formulated their long term vision of the transformation
process. In September 1989, when the first postwar govemmenrheaded by a -- :
non-communist prime niini.ster was formed in Poland, the new elites supported by the
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majority of ~e population put forward, as the long-term goal for the nation, creation of a
democratic political system based on a modem, open market economy.
However, the starting point for this process was difficult and complicated. The so
called "round table" agreement between Solidarity and Communist Party leaders in the
Spring· of 1989 included elements of political and institutional structure for the first' stage of
the transition. Most important, it restored the presidency .with Jaruzelski as the agreed upon
(

candidate and agreed to a freely elected Upper Chamber of the Parliament (Sejm). In the
Lower Chamber only 35 % of representatives were to be elected by democratic voting
pro~edures; thereby assuring continued Corpmunist control.
When Solidarity swept every seat that it contested, the Communist party lost control
of the process. · .Solidarity aligned with two smaller parties and put together a coalition

.

.

government with key posts such as the ministries ·of defense and internal security reserved
for Communist Party people; · Thus, the political game, that eventually resuJted in the first
non-communist prime minister in P~land in four decades, lasted three months. As· dramatic
as it was, that process carried within it serious seeds of future conflict.
The economy was weak and unstable; marked by massive shortages and a rate of
inflation that led to economic transactions calculated in dollars rather than Polish currency.
The new government inherited an economy burdened by a 43 billion hard currency debt to
foreign governments and commercial banks. It had no credibility for new loans of any kind.
As a consequence, the bargaining position of the Poland negotiating team for capital
'

~

resources wlth the international monetary institutions such as the IMF and World Bank was
that of the "younger (weaker) partner". •
In return for offering support and the financial help needed for the Polish- economic
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reform program, these monetary institutions-insisted upon.a very rapid schedule for the
restoration of mar:ket mechanism functions. While there was full agreement on both sides. on
the overall direction of-the reform process, party leaders fa Poland·.were worried and divided
over the issues of the speed of the transition process and the specific set of instruments·
proposed and used. They. feared the consequences for stability of the country ~ong the road
to the: market; in the middle term so to speak.

N
Poland is a special case, not necessarily because it was first to win its own ".peaceful
revolution," but because Poland paid the highest economic price for the decade of silent
resistance that opened the way for the other East Europeans for a quick and sometimes (as in
the Hungarian and-Czechoslovak cases) less costly _political turnover. One can argue ·with
good-will, that Gorbachev's approval, and his renouncing of the Brezhnev Doctrine that
',•

threatened to use military means to 'save socialism,' was a decisive element. However, in
the Polish case, so was the price paid in terms ·of economic decline associated with resistance
to martial law dating from 1981.
Poland's significance rests primarily upon the fact, that Poland has potentially the best
chance to realize two goals simultaneously--to build . an economy compatible with developed
western economies, and to reconstruct a democratic political- system. This chance is based
on consensus that under the circumstances the real key to reaching both goals lies i~
reversing the processes which

started with the nationalization act._

Positive changes in this

sphere started in Poland in the second part of the 1980s. The most important included·:
.

.

-informal·ownership .changes (so-called "nomenclature enfranchising") whichled to an
emerging new political elite and _started the process of rapid development of a ·middle class which was insignificant in the past. This riew political elite effectively searched
for a new· role other·than being "the decision-makers". At the core of its .vision ·of .
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needed change was the creation of new group economic interests.
"'Part of the organized opposition fired in the martial law. period tutned to private
economic activity·to make their living. This fact combined with the intellectual
potential of the group's strengthened economic interest supported· a new stage of their
involvement in society and power.
-Support from the general social movement which was based partly on the illusion
that. the first positive signs· of improvement in the material standard of living could be
achieved relatively fast once the radical reform got started. 4
Special comment is appropriate here. In part of the society pro-market attitudes are
to some extent more natural in Poland than in other countries of the former Eastern bloc.
Although three generations of East Central Europeans were raised in subnormal conditions,
the resulting· deterioration in the public consciousness seems to be have been less in Poland
than elsewhere. The historically rooted tradition of resistance against authority influenced
the way new Polish generations were brought up by their families. The concern for history
and tradition so necessary for the survival of the. nation after it disappeared from the map of
Europe at the end of the 18th century, closer and more continuous cultural contact with
Western Europe, and ties with relatives and friends in exile, all influenced education in letter
and spirit; thereby the posture of teachers and students as well. Individual pro-market
attitudes in Poland were manifested in the 198Os in ways that were shocking and
disappointing for many but that were an advantage for the econOIJlY as a whole. Those
attitudes are strengthened now by complete freedom to engage in all kinds of economic
activity.
An important legacy of socialism which has proven harder to overcome, however, is
a specific psychological barrier in the form of an obstacle in the process of reconstructing
democracy at the bottom Jevel. This is a reluctance to create associations, foundations,
non-profit organizations, etc. to realize the goals of smaller social groups. . Whereas this kind
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of social activity has emerged and is developing, it is still weaker than ··individual .economic .
)

'

activity: Its importance for economic well-being and for democratic' development cannot be
overestimated any more that·i, can the importance of a significant middle class for pro.,.market
ideas and behavior.
-In sum, the .long-term goal for the society and the nation has been defined,

and ·the

knowledge needed t9 reach it is relatively high. The majority of the population strongly
supported the first stage of economic shock therapy named by politicians and journalists alike the 'Big Bang' program. Drastic fiscal and monetary measures have been successful in• ·
restoring market equilibrium and reducing inflation. : Eliminating· the capital goods rationing .
system, withdrawing subsidies, liberating prices, introducing real positive interest rates and
-

-

.

internal convertibility of zloty together with freedom of economic activity dramatically
changed the operating conditions for companies apd created economic opportunities for · ·.
enterprising. citizens.· However, -households paid a heavy ·price for these,successes. ·The
purchasing power. of savings·was drastically decreased~ while the real value of wages ·and
salaries fell by 1/3 in . the first part of 1990 .. The.shock was worse because for-the majority
of households the level of income before the "operation" was very low, pegged to.the-old.
system~s government-subsidized,

low prices in the past.· After the firs_t two months. of 1990,

households in Poland had to face western-levei prices, while having less than the f01iner
'socialist! level of income to cover .expenses. ·,
Nevertheless, the Poles are committed to economic transformation.-· There-was
consensus that pensioners, children and the disabled must be sheltered from.the full"impact of
the consequences, which simply:meant that
the burden of 'cleaning·up' :the ground for '.the
..
'

next stage o(economic changes was put.mainly !JO the shoulders of those who :were .·
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employed in the state-owned companies or paid by the state budget.
The distinctive feature of Poland in this regard is that the goal itself is consistent with
traditional values of Polish society. Democracy and market appeal to concepts rooted in
Polish traditions and that realization came when real social and economic proccesses prepared
the ground for the transformation. Some processes like the completely new framework for
the market economy can be accelerated. Some like reconstruction of the grass roots for
democracy at the very. bottom must be indigenous and natural to be strong. In this sense the
overall perspective for Poland looks much better than in neighboring areas despite the current
differences in Poland's and those countries success at publicizing their real achievements.
V
The long-term goal· is considered obvious and logical by professionals and people in
Western countries because it is in accord with their experience, background and knowledge.
However, it is a problem that the language used to· identify and describe economiq phenomena

in formerly Socialist countries is taken directly from western economies wh~re its

meaning is established and tied
to well-developed markets. This complicates communication.
I

It has consequences for the scope, timing and the kind of help offered; and, practically
speaking, the help that is offered is not always that which is needed. No one has ever before
made the transition from an internally consistent socialist system to the market and
democracy. It is easier to comJ!lunicate about the problems involved in reconstructing
democracy in the sense that the language developed for this process is able to cover much
more universal experience under a variety of conditions.
Unfortunately at this stage this is not the case with the language used to formulate
economic problems of transition. 5 The frequent outcome is thus misunderstanding,

--·
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impatience and -discouragement on one side, and not well suited "expertise and suggestion of
inappropriate instruments,on the other. For example, take the idea.that liberalized~
equilibrium prices provide a good start toward II marketization 11 -by creating conditions· and
mechanisms for gradual- withdrawal· of the state from the economy. However, -in the
.beginning free prices .are not able to perform-· that function until the market infrastructure is
in place and an environment has been created .to adjust processes that do exist:· ·This is
essential-before free prices- should be considered even as an option on the micro level.
Letus,lookat another example. In-market economies; recession is a basically_
cyclical and/or structural problem. In the former socialist countries, it has basically a
systemic context; therefore the known regulatory instruments of macropolicy. are insufficient
here. There' are a ,variety of reasons, _but this is so·primarily-because the target _of such
'--

policy must be-created before those, instruments can be applied.
The concepts and instruments of regulatory policy- tested and frequently offered as .a
solution to post-Communist.systems were developed_ for the situation where the full market
infrastructure {for goods_and services, labor and financial flows) is well-established. - . Unfortunately, ·an elementary -market order will not appear in- those. countries until is: created.
thus, the fundamental task (aside from current, short-term problem-solving needed for,the
economy to survive) is to formulate and introduce the public policy to~create both_: - a new
structure of ~onomic subjects and a new legal and- institutional infrastructure.
. In this sense, while liberalization of prices is-needed, it solves -none of the serious
-problems at .hand. -,Meanwhile it is not possible to begin overcoming the .recession or the. process of restructuring the econo~y until the fundamental elements of the new economic
_system are completed. 6-
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This is not to say that the economic knowledge, skills and experience of the west are
useless, that the requirements of international financial institutions are totally
counterproductive,. or that the expectations ·of western businessman towards their counterparts
are totally unrealistic. It is only to make clear that at this stage both sides must be cautious
to be sure about the real nature and the roots of economic difficulties because familiar
symptoms in still basically state-owned and monopolized economies frequently have a
different nature, are symptoms of a different disease ·so that the standard remedies developed
to treat the ills of market economies in some instances are likely to have unintended side
effects--to worsen rather than improve thesituation:
Contrary to some popular assumptions, from this point of view the countries of
Central Europe are in a similar situation .. For Western oqservers the current most visible
difference between Poland and its neighbors appears to be the fact that aside from its
achievements to this point in time, including new legal and institutional structures, Poland is
in deep recession. This difference is deceptive. In reality, Poland now has behind it what
other post-Communist countries of the region still have ahead. The deep recession and the
need for broad restructuring are in some sense inherent in. all command economies· attempting
to introduce market economies. This is a common legacy. _
Today's deep recession in Poland is the price paid for total transformation, while
recession in the other countries in Central-Europe (excluding former East Germany) stems
from the old system's barriers to growth and development. The will to overcome-the manydimensional legacy of the socialist system; to transform the system as a whole shows the
uniqueness of ;the Polish situation and the formidability of the task itself.
In this context, the problem of Poland's huge external debt must be taken into
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account. At this stage it is not important what government contracted the debt for what
purposes, or what the arguinents and.motives were of those who gave credit lines in.the past.
The tough reality is- that starting on the road to the total transformation with 46 billion hard
currency debt--even without single dollar of financial help in the meantime--with a 10%
interest ·rate, Poland would, be iri debt ·by 76 · billion. within five years. ,Debt servicing could
·reach 80% of the country's total export value. No stabiliied, developed.market economy could bear •imch burden. If there are vital interests of the West in the success· of the
'.

··

transformation o[thelargest country of the European former .socialist camp~-bold political
decisions to reduce the debt must be made. The ~hole set of arguments that Poland is not
the only, and even not the rriost per capita, indebted· country .in the world. miss the point.
Long term interests of creditor countries in the potential ·success of the -Polish transfohnation,
on the one hand; and the consequences of taking away any chances to achieve such success
\

despite the commitment, burdens· and efforts, on the other, must be weighed together. That
is why the ultimate decision in this case is a political one. Arriving at a formula, and·the·: ·
practical·implementation
of that formula, are. professional tasks but not.the-decision-itself
•.
.
.
Western realization of this problem was undoubtedly behind the decision for a 50% reduction ·
of Polish debt that was announced from Paris in March 1991. But it does not

mean that the

burden of debt service in limiting opportunities is over for ·Poland. The decision meets··
· absolutely minimal requirements·if it is to-have any practical'sense.:i>oland.must now
negotiate bilateral agreements with creditor .countries. Wide scale and indepth understanding
of the complexity of ~olish task is needed to enable deeper bilateral reduction, to find a . ·
practical formula and instruments of implementatjoli \\'.hich are fully consistent with. Polish
possibilities for transformation.
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VI
As mentioned earlier, the general logic of the Polish systemic transformation is based
on the assumption that the market economy will constitute the real basis for our democratic
j

political system. The market economy itself needs as its roots a new structure of economic .
subjects whose reactions to the market signals reflect competition·, hard budget constraints
and profit motive as the. criteria for their economic decisions. This must be a structure in
most instances based on different forms of private ·ownership. · In this way, privatization in
Poland is perceived as multi-dimensional in social, political and economic aspects as well as
in long-run outcomes.
The political- aspects, however, have different meaning than those which accompanied
the wave of privatization (or deregulation as in the U.S.) in the late seventies and in other
western countries in the 1980s; Unfortunately, it is not a 'simple' shift between political
forces within a stable well-developed system with consequences for the. degree of
responsibility of government and market as mechanisms for allocation of resources. _,
. Generally speaking, revitalization of private ownership is assumed to be fundamental
for the. social and political processes needed to reconstruct democracy and the market system ·
itself. With regard to the social aspect of the process, there .is a great need for people to be
"

active in different ways at local, regional, and state levels. There is a need for some wide
scale social -movement similar to the Solidarity movement in the past but· with reformulated
goals. The effort this time must be directed toward solving local and regional problems by
the people themselves within the framework created and agreed upon locally and regionally.
Altruism and. a high -level of social and political sensitivity are valuable characteristics of
human personality, but not politically reliable in the long-run. Individual and group interests
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·, can be. a much broader and rational stimulating force to count. on in this respect. . Private
ownershipis assumed to reflect group economic interest and to force people toward
organizational forms suitable for achieving specific group goals. This is the found~tion of a
pluralistic society. It is assumed that in the process; the II}.entality .of :part of the society will
be changed in a more-liberal (in European sense) direction, and that-rediscovered economic.··
interests will provide.-the basis for the relatively'.stable political parties and ·programsin
.

.

future .. The relatively small and weak middle class in Poland currentlfcannot play its
stabilizing role. similar Jo its counterparts in. mature democracies. Private owners~ip is the
way_ to widen its scope, strengthen its stabilizing role, spread its. values and attitudes and at
the same time create material· roots for a general climate favoring individual_ social and·
political activity;·

.1

Despite the g~eat number of parties· currently registered in Poland,. the society has
been generally resistant to this form of political activity. Sociologists point to· a kind of
{

anti-party syndrome. This kind·of,syndroine on the .one hand and more than 100 parties; on·
0

· the other, ate not an appropriate base for stable de111ocracy_.7 So, despite some.of the valid
objections to the interest. group type of democracy, at the beginning of the transfomiation
process the idea of creating a- system· based on pluralistic interest groups may be the i:nost
realistic option under'the:existing circumstances. The,_process of radical reform on the road ·
to a modern market economy requires strong,. long-term "support but also a relatively efficient
political system to reconcile emerging economic conflicts. _. Although it could be argued. that a
benign authoritarian system would have to ·be more politically efficient at the very beginning,·
this is not a realistic _alternativejn the near or more distant future. For Poland, it is not a
socially or politically acceptable alternative in any cas~. ·
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The political task is to find our own form of democracy; . The new constitution is
supposed to formulate general principles in this respect. · Stress should be put, however, not
so much on ideas as on the processes themselves because the existing reality cannot be
abandoned and replaced from one day to another by some radically different reality. The.
advancement of the processes in question distinguish Poland from our neighboring countries. ·
In this sense Poland--one .nationality in one nation--potentially has the best chance to build
stable a democracy within one generation.
The irony is that what could be one of the important accelerating ,forces in the
process, namely rapid and wide privatization, is contradictory in practice to the needs of·
economic efficiency in the short run. In the majority of cases, to be market oriented,
productive and innovative, companies need owners behaving like owners by risking their own
money in decision making.· Unfortunately, there was not enough domestic capital to buy out
the majority of the state-owned companies and thereby to privatize the economy quickly so
that the scale of financial risk to new owners could motivate their new behavior. Individual.
savings were low in the past as the consequence of the state policy and were largely
eliminated in their real purchasing power in 1990 by the tough monetary policy introduced to
take away an excess of liquidity from the market combined with the liberalization of
prices--both needed to restore market equilibrium. But in practice this meant that whatever
known technique is used--the so called capital (or British) way of privatization is closed in
the short run.
From the moral, social and political point of view, it looked attractive to give each
citizen a voucher of the same face amount to compensate for.past consumption sacrifices, to
dispose of freely later on the newly created financial market for buying equity shares of
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privatized companies, but this strategy basically missed the economic point. Moreover, -its. implementation could have many potentially· dangerous consequences in th~ future._ The. poor
majority would·be likely to sell newly bought. shares at once, which in the worst case would
have destroyed their market value, undermining at the same time the role of the financial .
market at the first stag~ of its existence. Ariother serious consequence could be that a small
group could gain control of property rights to; production capabHities paying almost a
symbolic price for future-economic,power and creating a bipolar income structure· Within
society. No serious economic-problems can be-solvecLby substituting a .small group's privatemonopoly for the previous State monopoly. On the contrary, it creates new·potentially
serious difficulties.
Such vouchers, however, are considered the most serious option open to the
goverpmerit to clear up issues between the state and former owners. ·They can be reasonably
used as an equivalent for the part of.past profit losses· in the reprivatization process because
relatives of the former owners are small in number in Poland and not many former owners
abroad are expected to return.
Privatization. of small. and middle-sized state owned companies can and is proceeding
relatively quickly. The.bill passed in June, 1990 opened the doors for many privatization
techniques such as a Polish- stock market,._transformation into ESOP-type companies; full_
employees' companies; cooperatives; bankruptcy and auction of the assets of liquidated
.

...

,

,

'

---

. firms, leasing and so on: Their common fd.ture ~s that the. process itself and the ~hoic~ of
specific tech~ique is based on economic and not s~cial egalitarian criteria.
Unfortunately, at the moment, the "big" privatization on a significant scale can not be
•

<

done as quickly as the economy at large needs. 8 · Those ·needs include short-and long-run
-

.

.

.

'

18

anti-recession imperatives: i.e., clear legal statu~ of the enterprise combined with clear
decision-making responsibilities; more flexible allocation of resources and adjusting
reactions; accepting responsibility for the strategy developed and financial resources found to
cover the needs.
Realistically speaking, in the next 2 or 3 years, the best that can be hoped for is that
the economy can gain prosupply and microrestructuralization effects from the privatization of
small and middle-sized companies· and some benefits from the improvements introduced in
large-scale, still state-owned enterprises. The planned improvements would come potentially
from two main sources:.
-a more competitive, market environment outside the current structure managed by the
government
-some changes introducing elementary order into responsibility for decision..;making
inside the state companies, combine.9 with buyer market conditions and hard budget
constraints. This is to be introduced by changing the legal form of big companies
from the current ambiguous ones into joint stock companies with.100% of equities
owned by the Treasury of the State.9
In this way, the game in 1991 and 1992 will be played to achieve selective, piecemeal
successes. This is much better than nothing, but much less than what is needed. The
positive side is that in some sense it buys time to think about how to avoid mistakes so that it
will be possible to act quickly when the ground is prepared and there is a consistent plan.
The reservation "in some sense" refers to the unavoidable price which must be paid under
the circumstances; the price of additional social!J><?litical tensions.

'
However, time is needed to find the "golden centre" between real possibilities and
urgent needs. Poland is in a situation in which there seems to be no good solution in the
short run that will allow us to achieve many goals simultaneously. What makes the problem ·
worse is that these goals are closely tied together. Besides, at this stage great prudence is
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needed to help create .the new ·structure which would be competitive enough, but, at the same
time, strong enough to face the challenge of new techniques and of future outside . ·
competitors~ ·

It is not.assumed that the hopes attached to·privatization can solve·a11 basic:problems.
That would be an.extreme, orthodox and stupid attitude~ The degr:ee of complication,
contradictions, multi-dimensional outcomes of decisions all call for unconventional ideas;·
decisions, instruments, and·reactions. What was learned from·the experience of the outside
world; however, is that although the market itself is not the guarantee. for development and a
high standard of living, there is no possibility of achieving these goals without it. The-real
market cannot exist without private owners organized in th~ variety of forms. In- this sense
privatization is the key to the market because it can create and constitute its own roots. The
long-term goals of Poland are·much wider, but privatization can be helpful to reach them as·
well.
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ENDNOTES

1.

Sec: J. Staniszkis, Outologiz ,Socjalizmu; In Plus; Warsawa, 1989.

2.
The non-state sector in Poland was bigger than that because cooperatives existing in
different sectors had formally non-state legal status although in practice they were included in
the state sphere. The problem with private ownership rested upon the fact that interpretation of
the law by the state judiciary created legal ambiguity and uncertainty for the owners.
3.
The outcome of those processes was the fundamental for "the round table" with Solidarity
agreement in the Spring of 1989 on the party side.
4.
This enthusiastic support made it possible start to the transformation by the shock therapy
which, within a few months of 1990, dramatically changed the economic environment in Poland.
5.
Janes Kornai's efforts to develop such language are worth noticing. See for example J.
Kornai: · Economic of Shortage, Amsterdam, Holland 1980.
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6.
Assuming that the new government does not want to allocate resources as in the past and
repeat similar mistakes. It is not to say that the state is absolutely dispensable. here. The
general problem is that in the beginning threre is no m3:1"ket criteria for ·such decisions.
7.
The experience with a multiparty (but weak) party system without strong central parties
looks d1scouraging.
·
·
8.
The •majority and most important parts of production capabilities are organized in large
monopolized structures owned by the state.

.

,

,/

9.
.Treasury of the State newly created institutions are self-financing and responsible for
selling and buying of equities at 1ts disposal.

